Reciprocal cooperation between unrelated rats depends on cost to donor and benefit to recipient by Schneeberger, Karin et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Reciprocal cooperation between unrelated rats
depends on cost to donor and benefit to
recipient
Karin Schneeberger1,2*, Melanie Dietz1 and Michael Taborsky1
Abstract
Background: Although evolutionary models of cooperation build on the intuition that costs of the donor and
benefits to the receiver are the most general fundamental parameters, it is largely unknown how they affect the
decision of animals to cooperate with an unrelated social partner. Here we test experimentally whether costs to
the donor and need of the receiver decide about the amount of help provided by unrelated rats in an iterated
prisoner’s dilemma game.
Results: Fourteen unrelated Norway rats were alternately presented to a cooperative or defective partner for
whom they could provide food via a mechanical apparatus. Direct costs for this task and the need of the receiver
were manipulated in two separate experiments. Rats provided more food to cooperative partners than to defectors
(direct reciprocity). The propensity to discriminate between helpful and non-helpful social partners was contingent
on costs: An experimentally increased resistance in one Newton steps to pull food for the social partner reduced
the help provided to defectors more strongly than the help returned to cooperators. Furthermore, test rats
provided more help to hungry receivers that were light or in poor condition, which might suggest empathy,
whereas this relationship was inverse when experimental partners were satiated.
Conclusions: In a prisoner’s dilemma situation rats seem to take effect of own costs and potential benefits to a
receiver when deciding about helping a social partner, which confirms the predictions of reciprocal cooperation.
Thus, factors that had been believed to be largely confined to human social behaviour apparently influence the
behaviour of other social animals as well, despite widespread scepticism. Therefore our results shed new light on
the biological basis of reciprocity.
Background
Cooperative behaviour is widespread among animals
[1,2]. Theoretical models include both costs to the
donor and benefits for the receiver as important para-
meters for cooperative behaviour to evolve [3-5]. While
costs to the donor may be outweighed by indirect fitness
benefits due to genetic similarity or relatedness with the
receiver [2,3,6-9], cooperation between non-kin can
evolve by mutualism or reciprocity [4,10,11]. Similar to
Hamilton’s rule explaining the evolution of cooperation
by kin selection [3], costs and benefits play a crucial
role also in the evolution of reciprocal cooperation [5].
However, their importance for an animal’s decision to
cooperate is little understood [12,13].
Reciprocal cooperation [10] among unrelated social
partners has been described in a wide range of species,
including mammals, birds and fish [11,14-20]. Over the
past 40 years the conditions have been hotly debated
under which reciprocal cooperation might emerge
[4,10,11], however experimental tests of the effect of
costs to the donor and benefits to the recipient on deci-
sions to cooperate are scarce. To bridge this gap we
manipulated both, the costs of the donor and potential
benefit to the recipient in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma
game using unrelated female wild-type Norway rats
(Rattus norvegicus).
Norway rats are known to live in social groups includ-
ing both related and unrelated individuals. They
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recognise individuals by odour [21] and can discriminate
different levels of relatedness in social partners [22].
Furthermore, they frequently show social behaviours
such as allogrooming, joint aggression towards intruders,
assemblage formation in winter and food storing [23]. In
iterated prisoner’s dilemma games, where two players
can choose to either cooperate or to defect [10], they
were shown to help an experimental partner based on
direct and generalized reciprocity [18,19]. Both mechan-
isms can induce evolutionarily stable levels of coopera-
tion [24-32]. In our experiments the focal test rats could
produce food for a social partner present in an adjacent
compartment by pulling a tray towards the cage
(Figure 1). In the first experiment, social experience of
the focal rats was manipulated by pairing them with
cooperative or defective partners (stooges) that had
either produced food for them (’cooperator’) or not
(’defector’) in the identical but role-reversed situation
(direct reciprocity [19]). We manipulated the costs of
the helpful act by varying the resistance of pulling food
for the experimental partner between 1 and 5 newtons,
which covered the range from a very easy operation to a
difficult action they could just accomplish. The rats
were trained to recognise visual signals associated with
the different degrees of resistance to enable them to
decide about giving help dependent on costs already
before handling the apparatus.
In the second experiment we manipulated the levels of
need of social partners (stooges) by food restriction
applied over night to induce hunger. In this experiment,
the focal rats were given either a helping experience by
an unknown third rat just before the test phase (general-
ised reciprocity [18]) using the same experimental setup,
or they were not given a social experience (control). We
tested for potential effects of the condition (body mass)
of experimental partners and predicted that if their need
is important for the decision of focal rats to help, poten-
tial receivers in bad condition should elicit more help
than potential receivers in good condition.
We found that rats provide more help to cooperative
than to defective partners, and that the amount of help
provided decreases more strongly with increasing costs
when the experimental partner is a defector. Further-
more, hungry rats received more help for food if they
were light, whereas if the receiver was satiated, focal rats
provided more help for heavy partners. Both results
meet the assumptions for costs and benefits being
important parameters in the decision of rats to help an
unrelated social partner.
Results
Effect of cost
In the first experiment the test rats pulled more often
for a cooperator than for a defector (X1
2 = 16.990; p <
0.001). Further, the number of pulls decreased with
increasing resistance in both social contexts (X4
2 =
38.547; p < 0.001). The latency until the first pull
increased with increasing resistance when helping a
defector, but not when helping a cooperator (X4
2 =
356.78; p < 0.001; Figure 2). When given the opportu-
nity to acquire food for themselves, the rats pulled more
often (X2
2 = 2793.9; p < 0.001) and with shorter time
delays (X2
2 = 485.9; p < 0.001) than when pulling for a
social partner.
Effect of benefit
In the second experiment the hunger status of social
partners together with their condition (weight) influ-
enced the number of pulls by the focal rat (X1
2 = 6.159;
p = 0.013; Figure 3). When the receiver was hungry,
focal rats pulled more often for light than for heavy
partners. In contrast, when the receiver was satiated,
focal rats pulled more often for heavy partners. When
the focal rats had not been helped by a third rat before,
they also pulled more often for heavy experimental part-
ners than for light ones (X1
2 = 4.036; p = 0.044).
Discussion
Focal rats pulled more often after receiving help than
after receiving none, confirming that they applied direct
(first experiment) and generalised (second experiment)
reciprocity [18,19]. Apparently, the rats attempted to
raise the probability of getting help back in the future
Figure 1 Experimental setup. The focal rat (black, F) can pull the
tray (T) towards the cage with help of a stick (S) so that her social
partner (grey, P) can reach the food reward (R).
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by providing more help to cooperators than defectors.
Thereby they took the costs of the helpful act into
account, as the number of pulls decreased with increas-
ing resistance, and the latency until the first pull
increased only when helping a defector, but not a coop-
erator. In a self-rewarding control situation the test rats
pulled more often and with a shorter time delay for
themselves than they did when helping a social partner,
which shows that the pulling does not merely reflect a
conditioned response. One might argue that instead of
reflecting a strategic decision, the reduction of the pull-
ing frequency with increasing resistance could reflect
limited physiological ability. However, this does not
explain why the latency to start pulling increased with
increasing workload. Obviously the costs of helping
were assessed even before the rats experienced the bur-
den, by using the visual cues they had been trained to
relate to specific workloads (see Methods section). Pre-
vious studies of reciprocity in rats using the same
experimental setup revealed that the intrinsic pulling
frequency (the number of pulls a rat performs when
alone in the cage, i.e., without social partner) did not
Figure 2 Residuals of the number of pulls (A) and latency to
first pull (B) in dependence of the pulling resistance and social
experience. (A) The frequency of pulling food for previous
cooperators and previous defectors declined with increasing costs
(measured as resistance in newtons (N); mean ± standard error; n =
14 rats tested in both situations). The focal rat pulled more often for
cooperators than for defectors (p < 0.001; see text). (B) The latency
from the start of experiment to the donor’s first pull increased with
costs when the focal rat was paired with a social partner that had
previously defected (p < 0.001; mean ± standard error; n = 14).
Figure 3 Number of pulls in dependence of the weight of the
social partner. (A) The number of pulls of focal rats for a hungry
partner decreased with increasing weight of the experimental
partner (p = 0.013). (B) In contrast, rats pulled for satiated partners
more often when these were heavier (p = 0.013; two overlapping
points were slightly shifted to make them visible in the graph); n =
14 for both treatments.
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differ after experiencing a cooperator or a defector [18].
Therefore, pulling in these experiments is clearly a
social act and does not reflect copying, reinforcement or
mere conditioning.
The results of our second experiment suggest that rats
judge the relative need of their social partner and adjust
their helping behaviour accordingly. Focal rats provided
more food to hungry receivers in bad body condition that
would suffer from hunger more severely. Two mechan-
isms might be responsible for the test rat’s awareness of
their experimental partner’s need: 1) The donor may gain
information about the hunger level through the signalling
of need by the receiver. For example, rats may use ultra-
sound vocalisation as such signals are applied in a range
of social and stressful contexts [33]. However, differences
in activity and behaviour between hungry and satiated
rats were not observed in our experiment. 2) The donor
may judge the need of the recipient through inadvertent
physical cues. For example, rats gain information about
food preferences of group mates through odour cues
from their breath [34]. They might also gain information
about other, hitherto unknown traits from their experi-
mental partner’s body.
When the receiver was satiated, the focal rats pulled
more often for heavy than for light partners, which was
also the case when the focal rat had not received help
before. This might suggest that unconditional help, in
particular, is contingent on the relative status of a social
partner, as in Norway rats body mass correlates with
dominance [35]. Helping a dominant partner might
reduce the probability of punishment for defection
[36,37]. Alternatively, helping dominant individuals pre-
ferentially might be more effective in improving the
social reputation of the donor than providing help to a
subordinate partner [38].
Conclusion
To our knowledge, our study provides the first empirical
evidence for strategic decisions of helpers contingent on
the costs of donors and the potential benefit to receivers
in a prisoner’s dilemma situation, which supports the
predictions of theoretical models of the evolution of
cooperative behaviour. In a different experimental situa-
tion, capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were found to be
affected in their decision to invest toward collective
goals by the relative effort that was demanded, i.e. the
number of times a monkey had to hand a rock to an
experimenter before getting a reward [39]. Hence, as
predicted by evolutionary theory animals do seem to
take costs into account when deciding about coopera-
tion. This is consistent with the observation that exam-
ples of reciprocal cooperation in natural or semi-natural
conditions often involve seemingly inexpensive beha-
viours such as allogrooming [14,40,41].
Furthermore, our data indicate that potential benefits
to the receiver can also influence the propensity of ani-
mals to cooperate, as was suggested by the interaction
between effects of experiencing cooperation and the
need (hunger) and body condition of the social partner.
At the proximate level, generosity of similar type has
been assumed to be ‘gratifying’ to the donor in non-
human primates [42], which might constitute a reward
mechanism involved in the delivery of benefits to others.
At the ultimate level, the probability to receive future
help should be increased by preferably helping needy
social partners for such discrimination mechanism to
evolve. This can be accomplished in two possible ways,
either if it raises the propensity of receivers (direct reci-
procity) or eavesdroppers (indirect reciprocity) to help
the cooperator on future occasions, or if it increases the
survival probability or condition of needy receivers,
which in turn would raise the probability that these can
exert help to the cooperator (direct reciprocity) or to
anyone (generalized reciprocity) in future interactions.
As rats have been demonstrated to show both, direct
and generalized reciprocity, both possibilities may
apply [27].
In our experiment the motivation of test rats appar-
ently changed between different contexts: When helping
a hungry social partner after receiving help from some-
one else, the need of the partner rat influenced the
motivation of the donor to help, which might indicate
empathy [43]. In contrast, when the rat had not been
helped before, its cooperation seemed to be motivated
by other functions, such as punishment avoidance or
building reputation. Factors that had been believed to be
largely confined to human social behaviour may influ-
ence the behaviour of other social animals as well [44],
indicating that reciprocal cooperation in animals and
humans should be viewed in an evolutionary framework.
Methods
Housing and training of the rats
The female rats were bred in the Animal Physiology
Department, University of Groningen, Netherlands and
were housed at the Ethologische Station Hasli near Bern
in groups of 3 - 5 individuals with their litter-mates.
The climatic housing conditions were held constant at
20°C and 50-60% humidity under a 12:12 h light-dark
cycle with lights on at 8 pm. Food (rat pellets) and
water were provided ad libitum. As rats are nocturnal,
the training and experiments were performed during the
dark phase. The rats were given extensive handling
experience from an early age, and therefore they were
used to the presence of an observer. This also ensured
that the rats were not stressed by the handling proce-
dure and transportation during the training and the
experiments. The experimental setup was similar to that
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used in previous cooperation experiments with rats
[18,19]: A testing cage was divided by a wire mesh into
two compartments. In front of the cage, a tray was
installed that glided with ball bearings on a rail. A stick
was attached to it so that it could be reached by the rat
in the cage (see Figure 1). The rat pulling the stick
moved the tray closer to the cage, so that a food reward
(one oat flake) placed on the tray could be reached
either by herself (early training) or an experimental part-
ner (major training and all experiments).
During a 3-months training phase, the rats were
trained individually to pull the stick. First, the rats were
made familiar with the tray by finding the food reward
on the tray without having manipulated the stick. Then
the tray was moved stepwise out of the cage so that the
rat had to pull the tray to reach the reward. The dis-
tance of the tray from the cage was increased continu-
ously until the rat pulled the tray along the whole way
without the help of the trainer. Rats that did not learn
to pull at that stage were excluded from the study. In a
second training phase, the resistance of the tray was
increased manually from 1 - 5 newtons in steps of one
with help of adjustable screws. This range of resistances
was elaborated in a pilot study, where the rats were
tested for the maximum resistance at which they could
still pull the tray. Specific visual cues corresponding to
the respective resistances were presented in front of the
cage so that the rat could easily see them. By pulling the
tray under varying resistances with corresponding sym-
bols, the rats learnt to associate the visual cues with the
workload. Rats had been shown previously to use visual
signals for behavioural decisions [45]. Subsequently, the
rats were made familiar with a reciprocity situation:
Two unfamiliar, trained rats were placed in the cage
separated by a wire mesh. Only one rat had access to
the stick and could pull the tray towards the cage under
the low resistance of 1 newton. Only the experimental
partner, but not the pulling rat, had then access to the
food reward. The roles were exchanged in the subse-
quent session. The number of pulls rats had to perform
before switching roles was increased in every session
until the rats kept their role as donor or receiver con-
tinuously for seven minutes.
The housing of the rats and the experimental proce-
dure adhered to the Association for the Study of Animal
Behaviour Guidelines for the Use of Animals in
Research and were approved by the Swiss Federal Veter-
inary Office (Kanton Bern, permit #71/6).
Experimental design
The experimental design and procedure was modified
after [18,19]. For the experiment, a defective and a
cooperative partner were assigned to each of 14 focal
rats. The testing cage was the same as the training cage,
divided in halves by a wire mesh. Every rat was put into
one compartment of the cage with visual, acoustical and
olfactory contact to its experimental partner. In the first
experiment, every focal rat faced two different social
situations in a random sequence: 1) she was helped by a
cooperative partner (’cooperative situation’) that pulled
for the focal rat for a period of 7 minutes, during which
at least one pull occurred (median = 4 pulls per 7 min);
or 2) she did not receive help from the experimental
partner (defective situation) during a period of 7 min-
utes, during which the latter did not pull the stick [18].
Directly after the experience phase, the stick and the
food reward were switched to the other side and the
focal rat had now the possibility to provide help for its
experimental partner (direct reciprocity paradigm). The
duration of this test phase was again 7 min, the resis-
tance of the tray was set to a value of 1 - 5 newtons and
the corresponding visual cue was provided in front of
the cage. Both rats received a food reward directly after
the experience phase to prevent pulling behaviour to be
caused by reinforcement [18]. During the experimental
phase, the acting rat was not directly rewarded for pull-
ing. On a single day, all 14 rats were tested for both, a
cooperative and a defective situation with the same pull-
ing resistance, followed by a break of two days. The
sequence of the two social experiences and five different
resistances was randomised, whereas the cooperative
and defective partners stayed the same throughout the
experiment. Both, the frequency and latency to pull
were noted and all the rats were weighed after each
replicate. Increasing resistance of the tray reflects
increasing costs of helping, while the latency to start
pulling and the number of pulls performed by the focal
rat during an experimental phase of seven minutes were
used as measures of the propensity of test rats to help
their social partner.
For the second experiment, the social partners were
food restricted over night to induce hunger and were
presented to the focal rats as partners in the same
experimental setup but without changing the donors’
workload, which was kept at 1 newton. The focal rats
were given a cooperative experience by a third rat before
having the opportunity to help the food restricted part-
ner (generalised reciprocity paradigm [18]). In the con-
trol situation the focal individuals were not provided
with any social experience, which allowed to test
whether rats would provide unconditional help as read-
ily as generalised reciprocity. The sequence of both,
social experience and hunger status of the experimental
partner were randomised, with every focal rat being
tested in all four situations. The rats were not related to
each other and had never met or interacted before. The
latency and frequency of pulls were noted and the focal
and partner rats were weighed after each replicate.
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Statistics
To test for treatment effects (social experience, hunger
status, resistance), we used generalised linear mixed
models, including individual identity of the focal rats as
subject in all models, as the experiment used a repeated
measures design. All tests employed correction for Pois-
son distributions of the data. As factors, we included the
single treatments and their combinations for each
experimental session. All analyses made use of the R
statistical software (version 2.8.1, http://www.r-project.
org) with the “lme4” and “lattice” packages.
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